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INTRODUCTION

Intervention under International Law
M.N.S. SELLERS †
INTRODUCTION
The lawfulness or legitimacy of "external" intervention in the
"internal" affairs of sovereign states is one of the most basic
controversies in modern international law. The question arises in
three separate but related forms: When is intervention lawful? When
is intervention legitimate? And when should intervention occur?
Discussion here will focus on the legal question, but legitimacy,
morality, and brutal reality all form and sometimes trump the law.
They dictate the parameters within which all legal determinations
take place, including the legality of cross-border interventions. By
“intervention” I mean any activity by one state or its agents that
influences the actions or attitudes of another state, but particularly the
threat or use of force, because force is particularly intrusive,
particularly persuasive, and often particularly resented by those
subjected to its power.
Since its earliest elaboration by Hugo Grotius1 and Emer de
Vattel2 international law has rested on a simple analogy and two
basic premises: just as every human being should be free and equal
and independent in all those things that concern her or his private
interests, so too each state should be free and equal and independent
in all those things that concern that state's domestic or "sovereign"
affairs.3 As reaffirmed by the United Nations Charter, this requires
both that all nations promote "respect for human rights and

† Regents Professor of the University System of Maryland and Director of the
University of Baltimore Center for International and Comparative Law.
1. See generally HUGO GROTIUS, DE JURE BELLI AC PACIS (1625) (providing
one of the earliest theories of international law).
2. See generally EMER DE VATTEL, DROIT DES GENS (1758) (further
developing the foundations of early international law).
3. Cf. U.N. Charter pmbl. (declaring that the United Nations seeks to "reaffirm
faith in fundamental human rights . . . [and] in the equal rights of men and women
and of nations large and small”).
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fundamental freedoms for all"4 and that outsiders not interfere in
"matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any
state."5 More specifically, there should be no threat or use of force
"against the territorial integrity or political independence of any
state."6 This raises the questions: what rights are “fundamental"?;
which actions violate a state's "independence"?; and above all, what
constitutes the "domestic" or “internal” province of states?
I.

THE DOMESTIC JURISDICTION OF STATES

If, as Vattel, Grotius, and the Charter of the United Nations
suppose, states (like individuals) should be free and independent and
enjoy some zone of autonomy that others must respect, it follows that
they have an autonomous legal domain of "domestic jurisdiction"
over their own “internal affairs.” The domestic jurisdiction of states
includes those areas that international law does not reach and that in
some circumstances international law should actively protect against
the improper interventions of others. Domestic jurisdiction begins
where international jurisdiction ends and embraces those areas not
appropriate for international control. The difficulty of regulating
“intervention” arises in drawing this jurisdictional line. Some issues
do or should belong to the exclusive jurisdiction of states. Some
issues are or ought to be subject to the overlapping or complementary
jurisdiction of both domestic and international law. Some issues are
or should be solely the province of the international rule of law.
Drawing the jurisdictional lines between different levels of
governance is a ubiquitous problem, already well-rehearsed in the
jurisprudence of American federalism or the relationship between the
laws of the European Union and the laws of its disparate members.
Judges and others must discern which issues are properly
cosmopolitan, and which issues are more properly parochial.7 The
United Nations Charter is far from being the only or decisive
determinant of international law, but it does embody some broadly
accepted principles about the parameters of international concern,
beginning with the importance of fundamental human rights, and the
4. Id. art. 1, para. 3.
5. Id. art. 2, para. 7.
6. Id. art. 2, para. 4.
7. See PAROCHIALISM, COSMOPOLITANISM, AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW (M.N.S. Sellers ed., 2012) (discussing the boundaries
between international law, national jurisdiction, and the private autonomy of
individuals).
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dignity and worth of the human person.8 There are also foundational
international commitments to "justice", to "freedom", and to the
"economic and social advancement of all peoples", so that "armed
force shall not be used except in the common interest."9
These very broad international interests raise the question
whether anything remains that is the essentially “internal” or
“domestic” affair of states, sufficiently to exclude the international
community, or the strictures of international law, from interceding to
regulate events. This category of the purely internal or domestic
jurisdiction is rapidly shrinking. Just as in the United States, it has
become clearer with the passage of time that commerce, the
environment, manufacturing, farming, and even crime need
regulation from the federal government to achieve a just and
beneficial rule of law in the States, so too increases in communication
and technology push more and more areas of law into the jurisdiction
of international institutions and international authorities. Whether by
treaty, by custom, or by the simple nature of the world, much that
once seemed domestic has become international, or must be
international, if it is to be regulated at all.10
II. FUNDAMENTAL HUMAN RIGHTS
Fundamental human rights and the inherent dignity of real
human beings provide the template and model for the sovereign
rights and self-determination of states, reflecting the extent to which
human rights have always been, a central concern of international
law.11 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948 and later
the human rights covenants have been extremely useful in clarifying
those fundamental human rights in which the international
community has the most direct interest.12 This interest turns out to
extend very broadly, reaching almost everything that is necessary for
human dignity and happiness. Each step in the greater articulation of
international human rights has narrowed the scope of domestic
jurisdiction, by clarifying the duties of states to their subjects, and the
concern of international law for the dignity of humanity everywhere.
8. U.N. Charter pmbl.
9. Id.
10. For example, the internationalization of commerce (the W.T.O.),
environmental regulation (the U.N.F.C.C.C.), and the protection of peace and
security (the United Nations Security Council).
11. E.g.., THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (U.S. 1776).
12. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948).
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The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR)13 and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights (ICESCR)14 both illustrate the vast jurisdiction of
contemporary international law, and a possible limitation on its
application to particular cases. Both covenants start by recognizing
the inherent dignity and the “equal and inalienable rights of all
members of the human family” as the “foundation of freedom,
justice, and peace in the world” and both demonstrate the very strong
interest of the international community in protecting fundamental
human rights.15 But they also go on to insist that all peoples have the
right to self-determination.16 By virtue of that right, they freely
determine their political status and freely pursue their economic,
social, and cultural development.17 Fundamental human rights are
best enjoyed in a strong and coherent community, and this
inescapable reality provides the point of contact between sovereignty
and liberty, linking collective identity with individual justice.
III. INDEPENDENCE
There is an inherent and fundamental value in the freedom and
independence of states and their peoples just as there is an inherent
and fundamental value in the freedom and independence of
individual human beings. States deserve freedom and independence
precisely because they are made up of real human beings who value
community and share culture, customs, and local circumstances.
These local circumstances may vary considerably from place to
place. Geographical particularities, as well as historical and cultural
traditions, can be dramatically different in different parts of the world

13. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, 999
U.N.T.S. 171.
14. International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16
1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3.
15. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 13, pmbl.;
International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, supra note 14,
pmbl.
16. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 13, art. 1,
¶ 1; International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, supra note
14, art. 1, ¶ 1.
17. Id.
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and among different peoples. This requires and justifies significant
variations in local law and customs.18
Justified differences in local law and customs suggest the benefit
of “subsidiarity” – the principle that jurisdiction and decision-making
powers should devolve as much as possible to local authorities,
provided that local authorities respect the overarching standards of
general international law. This means that in most areas of law,
jurisdiction is not very often purely domestic or international, but
rather overlapping. International law deputizes states (for the most
part) to enforce and implement universal human rights and other
international norms internally. But when states fail or refuse to
implement these rights, or even themselves violate basic standards,
their obligations to the international community persist. States that
violate the universal human rights of their subjects are also violating
fundamental principles of international law.
Human rights violations committed by the governments of states
or their agents present the starkest example of possible conflict
between the right to independence and fundamental human rights, the
two foundational principles of modern international law.19 All
violations of fundamental human rights are also violations of
international law, but enforcing them or any other international law
constrains the independence of states. States owe their duty to
respect universal human rights not only to those individuals whose
rights should not be violated, but also to the international community
as a whole, and to every other state and people.20 Human rights are
erga omnes, in that they concern everyone, and everyone has the
right to take countermeasures. But any response to such violations
must respect the domestic jurisdiction of the state concerned,21 and be
proportionate to the offenses that have been committed.22

18. See PAROCHIALISM, COSMOPOLITANISM, AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 7.
19. See MORTIMER N.S. SELLERS, REPUBLICAN PRINCIPLES IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW: THE FUNDAMENTAL REQUIREMENT OF A JUST WORLD ORDER (2006)
(discussing independence and universal human rights as some of the essential
principles of a republican system of international law).
20. INSTITUT DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL, LA PROTECTION DES DROITS DE
L’HOMME ET LE PRINCIPE DE NON-INTERVENTION DANS LES AFFAIRES INTÉRIEURES
DES ETATS [THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE PRINCIPLE OF NONINTERVENTION IN INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF STATE] (1989) available at http://www.idiiil.org/idiE/resolutionsE/1989_comp_03_en.PDF.
21. U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 7.
22. See SELLERS, supra note 19, ch. 21.
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IV. INTERVENTION
“Intervention” is a term of art in international law. Everything
that anyone ever does is an intervention in the strictest sense of the
term, to the extent that it has an effect or an influence on someone
else. We all have and should have very broad rights of intervention,
in this ordinary sense, over almost everything we encounter, because
we do and should enjoy a great freedom of action. Intervention is a
continuum, ranging from criticism to coercion. The legality,
legitimacy and practical value of an intervention will vary according
to two variables: the intrusiveness of the intervention contemplated
and locus of jurisdiction over its target. Intended interventions may
be barred either because the effects of intervention would be too
severe or because the subject matter of the planned intervention is no
business of those who want to intervene.
My primary concern here will be with intervention by force, both
because it is the most intrusive form of intervention and because the
United Nations charter so explicitly forbids the use of force “against
the territorial integrity or political independence of any state.”23
Lesser interventions may also be problematic,24 but do not so starkly
present the underlying conflict between independence and justice.
The United Nations is barred from intervening in matters that are
“essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state”25 and it
may be assumed that a similar prohibition also applies to
interventions by the states themselves.26 Interventions by force must
meet a very high standard, and face a near absolute prohibition when
they violate the “territorial integrity”, the “political independence” or
the “domestic jurisdiction” of any state.
This is not to say that intervention by force is never warranted.
The Charter of the United Nations contemplates the use of force at
the direction of the Security Council (Art. 42), in self-defense (Art.
51), through regional arrangements (Art. 52), and in other ways that
are not incompatible with the purposes of the United Nations or the
territorial integrity and political independence of states.27 Thus the
23. U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4.
24. See SELLERS, supra note 19, ch. 21.
25. U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 7.
26. See e.g., VATTEL, supra note 2, at 37–38 (discussing the injury done to
states by external intervention in their “affaires domestiques.”).
27. U.N. Charter art. 2, para 7.

2014]

INTERVENTION UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW

7

limits of legal intervention by force, like the concept of “domestic
jurisdiction”, ultimately depend on the principles and purposes that
justify the international order itself, including fundamental human
rights, the dignity and worth of the human person, the equal rights of
men and women, and the equal rights of nations, large and small.28
V. LEGALLY JUSTIFIED INTERVENTION
The clearest example of a legally justified intervention by force
under the traditional ius gentium was intervention to remove and
punish a tyrannical ruler, who oppressed the people subject to his
rule. Jean Bodin, the apostle of sovereignty, admitted already in the
sixteenth century that “it is a most beautiful and magnificent thing for
a prince to take up arms in order to avenge an entire people unjustly
oppressed by a tyrant’s cruelty.”29 Vattel explained more prosaically
that rulers lose the right to rule when they violate the purposes that
justify their authority.30
This raises the question whether interventions to prevent
oppression, to defend fundamental human rights, to protect the
dignity and worth of the human person, or to secure the equal rights
of men and women, or of nations large and small (to echo the words
of the Charter) are in fact or ever can be restricted by international
law. States parties to the Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide undertook to “prevent and to
punish” the crime of genocide31 and there have been a number of
recent military interventions both under the authority of the United
Nations Security Council, as in Libya in 2011,32 or without Security
Council approval, as in Kosovo in 199933 that have been justified by
those who intervened as being necessary to prevent “humanitarian
catastrophe.”34
28. Id., pmbl.
29. JEAN BODIN, ON SOVEREIGNTY 113 (Julian H. Franklin ed., 1992)
(translating JEAN BODIN, SIX LIVRES DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE (1586)).
30. VATTEL, supra note 2, at 22 (“. . . puisqu’elle n’auroit plus aucun droit ellemême, si elle vouloit opprimer une partie des Citoyens.”).
31. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,
art. 1, Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277.
32. See S.C. Res. 1973, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1973 (Mar. 17, 2011) (demanding an
“immediate ceasefire,” establishing a no-fly zone, and authorizing states to “take all
necessary measures” to protect civilians).
33. See Press Statement, Dr. Javier Solana, Secretary General of the N. Atl.
Treaty Org. [NATO], NATO (Mar. 23, 1999) (noting “no alternative [was] open
but to take military action”).
34. Id.

8

MARYLAND JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

[VOL. 29:1

The problem to be confronted in evaluating armed intervention
against genocide, or to prevent crimes against humanity, or otherwise
to enforce international humanitarian law, arises less from
determining the legality of such interventions in principle than in
applying the law and its principles to specific cases. Even the worst
violators of human rights standards and fundamental freedoms in
their own internal affairs, such as the Putin regime in Russia, cite
international human rights standards and the principles of
humanitarian intervention to justify their invasions and interference
in the internal affairs of other nations.35 Those culpable for the recent
Russian interventions in and occupations of the internal territories of
Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine all purport to respect the
requirements and humanitarian principles of international law, while
violating them in practice. Thus even the most oppressive states
concede the principle that tyranny justifies intervention, to justify
their own oppressive and illegal invasions.
VI. BAD FAITH
The Russian example illustrates the problem of bad faith in
international law. Grotius followed Cicero in identifying good faith
(“bona fides”) as the ultimate basis of international justice.36 For
although law and justice may at times be somewhat obscure, good
faith clarifies the result, by referring to the purpose of the
enterprise.37 When the law is clear, as in the prohibition of
aggression, malefactors will invent their own spurious facts, to justify
their crimes.38 In the absence of strong enforcement mechanisms,
this opens the interpretation and application of international law to
significant abuse. Aggressors will present their attacks as legitimate
intervention, and criminals will decry their just punishments as
unwarranted interference. The Putin regime has done both.

35. See e.g. Transcript: Putin defends Russian intervention in Ukraine, WASH.
POST (Mar. 4, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/transcript-putindefends-russian-intervention-in-ukraine/2014/03/04/9cadcd1a-a3a9-11e3-a5fa55f0c77bf39c_story.html (vigorously defending Russia’s intervention in Ukraine).
36. See GROTIUS, supra note 1, at 608 (“Fide enim non tantum respublica
quaelibet continetur, ut Cicero dicit, sed et maior illa gentium societas.”).
37. See id. at 609 (“Et iustitia quidem in caeteris sui partibus saepe habet
aliquid obscuri: at fidei vinculum per se manifestum est . . . .”).
38. Vladimir Putin, Address Concerning the Annexation of Crimea (Mar. 18,
2014) available at http://eng.kremlin.ru/news/6889.
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Even states seeking to act in good faith will make mistakes when
they act as judges in their own cases. The endorsement of the
Security Council, or the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, or the
European Union, or the Organization for Security and Cooperation in
Europe, or some other multi-state deliberative forum with significant
participation from liberal constitutional democracies will give even
well-intentioned and generally law-abiding states greater assurance of
legality in their international interventions than they would or should
have, when acting on their own. Multilateral interventions, pursued
with the approval of international deliberative bodies, will be more
likely to be accurate in their assessment of the law and facts than
deliberation wholly among the officials of any single nation. This
points to the great importance of deliberative procedure in
determining the substance of any international legal requirement.
Good faith requires a certain humility in considering the opinions of
others.
The requirement of good faith in applying the laws governing
international intervention to the facts of particular cases reflects a
fundamental distinction dividing the Grotian discipline of
international law from the Hobbesian field of international relations.
International law rests on universal principles, human dignity, and the
value of humanity as a whole. The field of international relations
studies power and personal advantage. International law, like all law,
claims to seek and implement justice and promote the common good
of all those subject to its rule. Whether or not this can ever be or
become entirely true, justice and the common good put significant
constraints on development of law in practice. Purported laws that
depart too far from widely shared perceptions of justice and the
common good will lose their ability to influence human behavior.
This is particularly true of international law, for which strong
enforcement mechanisms do not yet exist, beyond the public opinion
of states and their citizens.
VII. LEGITIMACY
Some international lawyers have asserted (for example) that the
NATO intervention in Kosovo was “illegal,” but nevertheless
“legitimate.”39 Whether or not this was true in fact, the claim serves

39. See e.g., Anne-Marie Slaughter, Good Reasons for Going Around the U.N.,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18, 2003, at A33 (“But in the end, the Independent International
Commission on Kosovo found that although formally illegal -- the United Nations
Charter demands that the use of force in any cause other than self-defense be
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to remind us that on vital questions such as international
interventions, arguments from legality are not the final word. All law
claims to realize justice, but if law fails to do so in practice, other
institutions will assert themselves. The concept of “legitimacy” in
any given context signifies having met the standard required for the
practice in question. The standard for international law is justice.
International law that fails to advance international justice, loses its
claim on our fidelity, on our obedience, and even on our interest in
what the law may or may not require, according to its own terms.
Law arises from the collective effort to embody legitimacy in
determinate rules and institutions. The only difference between legal
and other supposedly legitimate action is that law is mediated by
procedures that make legality more concrete. But in the case of
international law, these procedures are radically incomplete.
Lawyers and judges must find international legal rules in
international conventions, in international custom, in the general
principles of law recognized by civilized nations, in judicial
decisions, and in the teachings of the most highly qualified
publicists.40 None of these have sufficient institutional authority
entirely to supersede the direct appeal to external standards of justice.
Such authorities as “custom” and “teachings” of the publicists
constitute “evidence” of the law rather its source, which ultimately
arises in “those rules of conduct which reason deduces, as consonant
to justice, from the nature of the society existing among independent
nations.”41
Powerful states respect and obey international law (when they do
so) primarily because they believe international law to be legitimate,
according to the universal standard of legitimacy for law, which is
that law should achieve or approximate justice more effectively than
would be possible in the absence of law, or by direct appeals to
justice. States acting in good faith, when they contemplate
intervention, will look first to the law, and to the general principles of
law accepted by civilized nations. They will deliberate if possible, in
the context of multinational institutions, and decide, when they can,
in consultation with other nations that respect the international rule of
authorized by the Security Council -- the intervention was nonetheless legitimate in
the eyes of the international community.”).
40. E.g. U.N. Charter arts. 33–38 (creating the International Court of Justice).
41. HENRY WHEATON, ELEMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 20 (R.H. Dana, Jr.
ed., 8th ed. 1866).
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law. Legitimacy in the light of justice is the ultimate measure of
international law, and therefore of international intervention, and
unilateral intervention, without the approval of other nations, is
unlikely to be either lawful or legitimate, because it has not survived
the burden of persuasion, which is the best measure of validity in
international law.
CONCLUSION
External interventions to prevent or punish “internal” violations
of international law will continue to occur for the same reasons that
people have always acted against injustice. These include sympathy
for the victims, fear of the perpetrators, and the general desire to
establish just legal principles by enforcing them against violators.
Nations deserve a zone of sovereignty or “domestic jurisdiction”
within which to develop their own histories and cultures, but
governments never have the license to oppress or exploit the peoples
subject to their care. The sovereign rights of states derive from the
human rights of individuals. Governments that oppress their subjects
are violating international law, and should expect to face
consequences if their violations persist.
External interventions can be legal under international law and
legitimate sub specie aeternitatis whenever serious humanitarian
catastrophes require them and so long as the states enforcing
international law respect the territorial integrity and political
independence of the peoples they protect. All nations and their
peoples have the right to self-determination, so that the citizens
themselves may decide who their rulers shall be. Just as foreign
powers have no right to interfere in a state’s internal affairs, so too
local governments that deny their subjects’ human rights and
fundamental freedoms forfeit their right to rule. The limits of
external intervention depend on the value of human dignity, the
welfare of those oppressed, the good faith of the enforcers, and their
humility in the face of public deliberation. Sometimes the use of
force will be justified to put an end to serious and systematic attacks
on human dignity, but this cannot become the pretext for imperial
aggression.
Without justice, there will be no peace.42

42. Cf. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 12, pmbl.

